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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical framework for probably approximately correct (PAC) multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms for Markov games. The paper offers an extension to the
well-known Nash Q-learning algorithm, using the idea of delayed Q-learning, in order to build a new
PAC MARL algorithm for general-sum Markov games. In addition to guiding the design of a provably
PAC MARL algorithm, the framework enables checking whether an arbitrary MARL algorithm is PAC.
Comparative numerical results demonstrate performance and robustness.
Keywords Reinforcement Learning, Probability approximately correct, Markov Game, Nash
Equilibrium, Multi-agent system
1 Introduction
Decision-making and planning for autonomous agents in an unknown environment is often done through a reinforcement
learning (RL) approach. Sometimes systems involve more than one agent, in which case the problem fall into a multi-
agent reinforcement learning (MARL) domain. In MARL one is concerned with sequential decision-making for multiple
autonomous agents that operate in an unknown environment, in which the behavior of all agents jointly affects the
evolution of the system. Such problems are typically approached from a game-theoretic perspective, with each agent
trying to maximize their own reward function. Unlike situations where agent-environment interaction dynamics are
modeled as an Markov decision process (MDP), in MARL games the environment of each agent is non-stationary, adding
a layer of complexity to the problem. Indeed, existing MARL algorithms that can provide a probably approximately
correct (PAC) bound on the sample complexity involved in reaching a near-optimal behavior, are very rare [1]. The
paper contributes to bridging this gap with a general mathematical PAC characterization of a MARL algorithm, and a
new PAC MARL algorithm for general-sum Markov games.
A MARL algorithm can either be [1] fully cooperative, fully competitive, or mixed setting. Fully cooperative
MARL handles cases where all agents collaborate to achieve some shared goal, sharing the same reward function–such a
model is usually referred to as a multi-agent MDP (MMDP). As a result of shared reward function, Q-function is also
identical for all agents. Hence, an early and straightforward MARL algorithm for such setting is to perform the standard
Q-learning update [2]. While Littman [3] established the convergence of such algorithm to the optimal Q-values, the
convergence does not necessarily imply equilibrium policy since each agent might choose a distinct equilibrium when
multiple ones exist. The first MARL algorithm that provably converges to the equilibrium policy is Optimal Adaptive
Learning optimal adaptive learning (OAL) [4]. Recently, researchers tried to address the scalability issue that arises
when the system involves big number of agents, through value function factorization [5, 6]. Policy-based method is also
developed for cooperative MARL that is provably convergent [7].
For fully competitive MARL, most of the literature concentrated on two-agents game with zero-sum reward
functions. The reason is that, there is a huge computational barrier between solving two-player zero-sum game and
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multi-player one. In fact, even the simplest three-player zero-sum game is known to be PPAD-complete [8]. By defining
minimax value function, MARL in two-player zero-sum games reduces into single agent case where each agent tries
to maximize the worst case reward. More interestingly, optimal point of the minimax value function is the unique
fixed point of a Bellman operator, which bring the strong theoretical foundation of dynamic programing in use for
competitive MARL. Minimax Q-learning [9] extends the well-known Q-learning algorithm to zero-sum Markov games,
and is provably convergent to minimax Q-values and constitutes the Nash equilibrium policy. For fully competitive
setting, several PAC algorithms have also been developed. For instance, [10–12] have studied zero-sum turn-based
stochastic games and with the assumption of the availability of a generative model of the game, they have proposed
MARL algorithms that achieve near-optimal behavior with finite sample. Online PAC MARL algorithm has also been
developed for average-reward zero-sum stochastic games using the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty [13].
In mixed setting, finding a Nash equilibrium, as a general solution for mixed setting MARL, is actually PPAD-
complete even for a simple two-player game [14]. Moreover, value-iteration based methods might fail in general
to find stationary Nash or even correlated equilibrium for mixed setting [15]. Existing MARL algorithms for mixed
setting (e.g., Nash Q-learning [16]) are thus guaranteed to converge under quite strong assumptions. Given that finding
Nash equilibria is computationally challenging [17, 18], correlated Q-learning [19] circumvents Nash equilibrium
computation by computing instead (via linear programming) correlated equilibria for each stage game. Alternative
methods include Bellman residue minimization for approximation of Nash equilibria [20], and modifications to Nash
Q-learning where actions of agents are approximated by empirical averages [21].
The contribution of this paper is the generalization of the PAC MDP algorithm theorem [22] to PAC Markov games.
This serves as the basis for the introduction of a novel PAC MARL algorithm for Markov games, based on a new
extension of delayed Q-learning [23] into games, which we refer to as Delayed Nash Q-learning. This new PAC MARL
algorithm converges based on finite samples under the same conditions that Nash Q-learning [16] imposes.
2 Technical Preliminaries
A two-player finite Markov Game M is a tuple {S,A1,A2,R1,R2, T, γ} with elements
S set of states
Ai set of actions for player i
Ri ∶ S ×A1 ×A2 → [0,1] reward function for player i
T ∶ S ×A1 ×A2 × S → [0,1] transition probabilities
γ ∈ [0,1) discount factor.
A stationary policy pii for player i is a mapping pii ∶ S ×Ai → [0,1] that selects an action ai to be executed at
state s with its corresponding probability pii(s, ai). A non-stationary policy Ai can be defined as a tuple of stationary
policies Ai = (pii1, pii2, . . .), meaning that at step k in the game, agent i executes the policy piik. In a Markov Game, each
player tries to maximize its own discounted sum of rewards.
Definition 1. In a two-player Markov Game M where players are following policies pi1 and pi2, with action ai drawn
according to policy pii denoted ai∼pii , the value of state s for player i is defined as:
viM(s, pi1, pi2) ∶= EM {∞∑
t=0γtRi(st, a1∼pi1 , a2∼pi2) ∣ s0=s} .
Subscript M may be dropped when it clear from context.
Note that by restricting the rewards in [0,1], the maximum possible value of any state is bounded by vmax = 11−γ .
A Nash equilibrium is now a joint strategy in which the policy of each player is the best response to others.
Definition 2. In a two-player Markov Game M , a Nash equilibrium point is a tuple of policies (pi1∗, pi2∗) such that for
all state s ∈ S and for all players i = 1,2
{v1M(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) ≥ v1M(s, pi1, pi2∗)
v2M(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) ≥ v2M(s, pi1∗, pi2) ∀pii ∈ Πi , (1)
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where Πi is the set of all available policies for player i. In addition, (pi1∗, pi2∗) is called a global optimal Nash equilibrium
point if
{v1M(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) ≥ v1M(s, pi1, pi2)
v2M(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) ≥ v2M(s, pi1, pi2) ∀pii ∈ Πi .
Moreover, (pi1∗, pi2∗) is saddle point Nash equilibrium, if in addition to (1), we have
{v1M(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) ≤ v1M(s, pi1∗, pi2)
v2M(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) ≤ v2M(s, pi1, pi2∗) ∀pii ∈ Πi .
Every Markov Game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium point in stationary policies [24].
To adapt Q-learning into a multi-agent context, the first step is to recognize the need for considering joint actions
rather than individual actions. For a two-agent system, for example, the Q-function is now written Q(s, a1, a2), where
the pair (a1, a2) is referred to as the action profile. With these extensions of the standard concept of Q-function, and
with a Nash equilibrium as the desired solution, one can define the Nash Q-value [16]:
Definition 3. In a two-player Markov Game M with Nash equilibrium policy (pi1∗, pi2∗), for any state-action profile(s, a1, a2), the Nash Q-value Qi∗(s, a1, a2) for agent i is the expected sum of discounted rewards when both players
follow the Nash equilibrium policy from next period on:
Qi∗(s, a1, a2) = Ri(s, a1, a2) + γ ∑
s′∈S T (s, a1, a2, s′)viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) . (2)
Using this Definition, for all players i and state s, one can equivalently write [16, Lemma 10]
viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) = ∑(a1,a2)pi1∗(s, a1) ⋅ pi2∗(s, a2) ⋅Qi∗(s, a1, a2) .
The objective now is to design an RL algorithm that identifies the Nash equilibrium policy in a Markov Game when
the actual transition probabilities and/or reward function are not known. The procedure for finding this policy naturally
involves exploration of the Markov Game model. An RL algorithm usually maintains a table of state-action profile
value estimates Qi(s, a1, a2) for all players, which are updated based on the exploration data. During the execution of
this RL algorithm, the currently stored value for state-action profile (s, a1, a2) for agent i at time step t will be denoted
Qit(s, a1, a2). Assume that all players are utilizing the same RL algorithm and have their own estimation of Q-values
for all other players. Consequently, by considering each state of the Markov Game as a stage game (one-shot game)
with Qit(s, ∶) (denoting row s of the Q matrix) as the reward of each possible action profile for each player i, define the
current value of state s for player i as
vit(s) = Nashi(Q1t (s, ∶),Q2t (s, ∶)) ,
where the Nashi operator calculates the Nash Q-value for agent i in the stage game with rewards (Q1t (s, ∶),Q2t (s, ∶)).
We refer to a multi-agent RL algorithm in a game-theoretic context as Nash-greedy if, at any time step t and state s, it
instructs players to execute policies associated with some Nash equilibrium. The policy that is in force at time step t is
denoted pit, and the greedy policy for player i would be denoted in general as
piit(s, ai) = argNashai(Q1t (s, ∶),Q2t (s, ∶)) . (3)
3 Characterization of a PAC Multi-agent RL Algorithm
This section formally frames the characteristics of the desired multi-agent PAC RL algorithm in the form of a theorem.
The necessary technical stage is set through the following definitions and lemmas.
Definition 4. Consider a two-player Markov Game M = {S,A1,A2,R1,R2, T, γ}, which at time step t has Nash
Q-value estimates Qit(s, a1, a2) for agent i. Let Kt ⊆ S ×A1 ×A2 be a set of state-action profiles which are labeled
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known. The known state-action Markov Game
MKt = {S ∪ {z(s,a1,a2) ∣ (s, a1, a2) ∉Kt} ,A1,A2,R1Kt ,R2Kt , TKt , γ}
is an Markov Game derived from M and Kt by defining new states zs,a1,a2 for each unknown state-action profile(s, a1, a2) ∉Kt, with self-loops for all actions, i.e.: TKt(z(s,a1,a2), . . . , z(s,a1,a2)) = 1. For all (s, a1, a2) ∈Kt and
all players, it is RiKt(s, a1, a2) = Ri(s, a1, a2) and TKt(s, a1, a2, ⋅) = T (s, a1, a2, ⋅). When an unknown state-action
profile (s, a1, a2) ∉Kt is experienced, the rewardRiKt(s, a1, a2) = Qit(s, a1, a2)(1−γ) is accumulated for player i and
the model jumps to z(s,a1,a2) with TKt(s, a1, a2, z(s,a1,a2)) = 1; subsequently,RiKt(z(s,a1,a2), ⋅) = Qit(s, a1, a2)(1−γ)
for all players.
Probably approximately correct (PAC) analysis of multi-agent RL algorithms deals with the question of how fast
an RL algorithm converges to a desired fixed point. Since in the case of this paper this point is a policy that is -near
or better than the Nash policy, the PAC property of a multi-agent RL algorithm is understood here in relation to the
existence of a probabilistic bound on the number of exploration steps that the algorithm takes before converging to a
policy that is -near or better (in terms of value) than the Nash policy.
Definition 5. Consider a Markov Game M with Nash equilibrium (pi1∗, pi2∗) in which all players are independently
executing a given RL algorithm A. Let st be the state visited at time step t and Ait be the non-stationary policy that A
computes for player i at t. For a given  > 0 and δ > 0, A is a PAC if there is an N > 0 such that with probability at
least 1 − δ, and for all but N time steps, every player i satisfies
viM(st,A1t ,A2t ) ≥ viM(st, pi1∗, pi2∗) −  . (4)
Inequality (4) is referred henceforth as the -or-better Nash condition, and N as the sample complexity of A. If ∣ ⋅ ∣
denotes cardinality, the sample complexity can be a function of any combination of ∣S∣ , ∣A1∣, ∣A2∣, 1

, 1
δ
, and 1
1−γ .
Now let Kt be set of current known state-action profiles for an RL algorithm A at time step t, and allow it to be
arbitrarily defined as long as it depends only on the history of exploration data up to t. Any (s, a1, a2) ∉Kt experienced
at time step t marks an escape event.
The proof of each of the following three lemmas is very similar to that of the original version as it appears in
literature, which the reader is referred to for details.
Lemma 1. (cf. [25, Lemma 2]) For a two-player Markov GameM , theH-step value function for policy profile (pi1, pi2)
is defined as
viM(s, pi1, pi2,H) ∶= EM { H∑
t=0γtRi(st, a1∼pi1 , a2∼pi2) ∣ s0 = s}
and for H = 1
1−γ ln 1(1−γ) it holds
∣viM(s, pi1, pi2) − viM(s, pi1, pi2,H)∣ ≤  .
Lemma 2. (cf. [22, Lemma 9]) Given a two-player Markov Game M and a set of known state-action profiles Kt, the
value of any state s under any policy profile (pi1, pi2) in the known state-action Markov Game MKt is bounded by
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1−γ = 2vmax.
Lemma 3. (cf. [22, Lemma 8]) Suppose that a weighted coin that is flipped has a probability p > 0 of landing with
heads up. Then, for any positive integer k and δ ∈ (0,1), there exists m = O(k
p
ln 1
δ
), such that after m tosses, with
probability at least 1 − δ, one observes k or more heads.
The following theorem is one of the two main results of this paper. It offers sufficient conditions for a Nash-greedy
RL algorithm in a two-player Markov game to be PAC.
Theorem 1. Let M be a two-player Markov game in which players are executing a Nash-greedy RL algorithm A.
Denote (pi1∗, pi2∗) the Nash equilibrium of M , and Kt the set of current known state-action profiles at time step t.
Let MKt be the known state-action Markov Game at time step t and pi
i
t ∶= argNashai (Q1t (s, ∶),Q2t (s, ∶)) for brevity.
Assume that Kt =Kt+1 unless at time step t, an update to some estimated Nash Q-value, or an escape event occurs.
Suppose also that Qit(s, a1, a2) ≤ vmax for all players, state-action profiles and time steps.
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If for  > 0 the following conditions hold with probability at least 1 − δ ∈ (0,1),
optimism: vit(s) ≥ viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) − 
accuracy: vit(s) − viMKt (s, pi1t , pi2t ) ≤ 
complexity: the sum of the number of time steps where Nash Q-value updates occur plus number of time steps
where escape events occur is upper bounded by ζ(, δ) > 0 .
then the players will follow a policy that results at values which are at most 4 lower than a Nash policy on all but
O ( ζ(, δ)
(1 − γ)2 ln ( 1δ ) ln ( 1(1−γ))) ≃ O ( ζ(, δ)(1 − γ)2 ) (5)
time steps, with probability at least 1 − 2δ.
Proof. Pick , δ > 0, and suppose that algorithm A is executed by both players in game M , with Ait being the current
non-stationary policy of player i, for i = 1,2. Let st denote the state of the game at t, and set E be one of the two
possible events that can occur in the execution of algorithm A, H = 1
1−γ ln 1(1−γ) time steps after arriving at state st.
Event E can be:
• an update to any of the Nash Q-value estimates, or
• an experience of a state-action profile (s, a1, a2) ∉Kt (escape event).
Let pE be the probability that event E occurs, and verify that
viM(st,A1t ,A2t ) ≥ viM(st,A1t ,A2t ,H)≥ viMKt (st, pi1t , pi2t ,H) − 2vmax ⋅ pE .
The left inequality is due to all rewards being positive, and the right follows from the fact that following A1t , A2t in M
results in an identical behavior of following pi1t , pi
2
t in MKt , unless event E occurs which can at most reduce the value
by 2vmax (Lemma 2). From the above, now write:
viM(st,A1t ,A2t ) ≥ viMKt (st, pi1t , pi2t ,H) − 2vmax pE
Lemma 1≥ viMKt (st, pi1t , pi2t ) −  − 2vmax pE
accuracy≥ vit(st) − 2 − 2vmax pE
optimism≥ viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) − 3 − 2vmax pE .
Now, if pE < 2vmax the claim is proved: we have the 4-or-better Nash condition
viM(st,A1t ,A2t ) ≥ viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) − 4 .
If, on the other hand, pE ≥ 2vmax , Lemma 3 would guarantee with probability at least 1 − δ that ζ(, δ) occurrences of
event E happen within O( ζ(,δ)Hvmax

ln 1
δ
) time steps. However, the complexity condition guarantees with probability
1 − δ that ζ(, δ) is the maximum number of updates or escape events. With probability at least 1 − 2δ, therefore, and
for all but O( ζ(,δ)Hvmax

ln 1
δ
) = O( ζ(,δ)
(1−γ)2 ln ( 1δ ) ln ( 1(1−γ))) timesteps, it must be the case that viM(st,A1t ,A2t ) ≥
viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) − 4.
4 Delayed Nash Q-learning Algorithm
This section presents the second key contribution of this paper: a new RL algorithm for two-player Markov Games,
referred to as Delayed Nash Q-learning (Algorithm 1). Delayed Nash Q-learning is the first algorithm that is PAC in
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terms of converging to a policy which is arbitrarily near (or better than) the Nash equilibrium policy. The computational
complexity of Delayed Nash Q-learning is roughly the same as the well-known Nash Q-learning [16].
We assume that both players are executing the (same) algorithm. Thus, players keep the Nash Q-value estimates of
their opponents. This is made possible by the assumption that every player can observe the rewards of all players at
each step in the Markov Game. With the same observations, players’ estimates of the Nash Q-values are identical.
As the “delayed” term in the name suggests, the algorithm waits until a state-action profile is experienced m times
before it makes an update of its Nash Q-value. The update mechanism (of lines 24,25) requires a successful update to
change the Nash Q-value estimate, triggered by another parameter 1. Both m and 1 parameters are tunable. Similarly
to Delayed Q-learning [22] or R-max [26], the algorithm reported here utilizes the principle of “optimism in the face of
uncertainty” to encourage exploration by originally over-estimating the Nash Q-value estimates to some vmax.
Similar to Delayed Q-learning [22], Delayed Nash Q-learning maintains the following internal variables:
• li(s, a1, a2) is the number of samples gathered for the update ofQi(s, a1, a1) once it is the case that li(s, a1, a2) =m.
• U i(s, a1, a2) stores the running sum of target values that will be used for the update of Qi(s, a1, a1) once enough
samples have been gathered.
• bi(s, a1, a2) is the time step at which the collection of the most recent m experiences of (s, a1, a2) started.
• learni(s, a1, a2) is a Boolean flag indicating whether samples are being gathered for state-action profile (s, a1, a2).
It is set to true initially, and is reset to true whenever some Nash Q-value of player i is updated. It changes to false
when no updates to any Nash Q-values occur within a time window in which (s, a1, a2) is experienced m times, but
subsequent attempted updates of Qi(s, a1, a2) fail (cf. [22]).
5 PAC Properties of Delayed Nash Q-learning
In this section, we claim that Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm is PAC and we present its sample complexity bound.
The proof of this result requires the following assumption, which is the same requirement that the well-known Nash
Q-learning needs to guarantee convergence [16].
Assumption 1. For state s and time step t, Delayed Nash Q-learning encounters a stage game associated with(Q1t (s, ∶),Q2t (s, ∶)), which possesses either a global optimum or a saddle point Nash equilibrium. The algorithm may
use either of the two for its updates.
Before formally stating the PAC properties of the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm and proving the bound on its
sample complexity, some technical groundwork needs to be laid. To slightly simplify notation, let
κ ≜ ∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1 − γ)1 vi∗(s) ≜ viM(s, pi1∗, pi2∗) .
and note that subscript t marks the value of a variable at the beginning of time step t (particularly line 17 of the
algorithm) .
Definition 6. An attempted update is an event at which learni(s, a1, a2) = true and l1(s, a1, a2) = l2(s, a1, a2) =m.
An attempted update can be successful or unsuccessful depending on the condition of line 24 of the algorithm.
Definition 7. At any time step t of the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm, the set of known state-action profiles is
defined as
Kt ∶=K1t ∩K2t where Kit ∶= {(s, a1, a2) ∣ Qit(s, a1, a2)−Ri(s, a1, a2)−γ∑s′ T (s, a1, a2, s′)vit(s′) ≤ 31} (6)
For the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm a number of facts can be shown. The proof for these claims can be
found in different appendices at the end of this paper. First, the number of successful updates is bounded:
Lemma 4. The total number of updates during the execution of Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm is bounded by 2κ.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Attempted updates are bounded in number:
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Algorithm 1 The Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm
1: Inputs: S,A1,A2, γ,m, 1
2: for all s, a1, a2, i = 1,2 do
3: Qi(s, a1, a2)← vmax ▷ set Nash Q-value to its maximum
4: U i(s, a1, a2)← 0 ▷ used for attempted updates
5: li(s, a1, a2)← 0 ▷ counters
6: bi(s, a1, a2)← 0 ▷ beginning timestep of attempted update
7: learni(s, a1, a2)← true ▷ learn flags
8: end for
9: t∗ ← 0 ▷ time of the most recent successful update
10: for t = 1,2,3, ... do
11: let s denotes the state at time t
12: players choose (a1, a2) according to piit as in (3)
13: observe immediate rewards r1, r2 and next state s′
14: if bi(s, a1, a2) ≤ t∗ then
15: learni(s, a1, a2)← true
16: end if
17: if learni(s, a1, a2) = true then
18: if li(s, a1, a2) = 0 then
19: bi(s, a1, a2)← t
20: end if
21: li(s, a1, a2)← li(s, a1, a2) + 1
22: U i(s, a1, a2)← U i(s, a1, a2) + ri + γvi(s′)
23: if li(s, a1, a2) =m then
24: if Qi(s, a1, a2) −U i(s, a1, a2)/m ≥ 21 then
25: Qi(s, a1, a2)← U i(s, a1, a2)/m + 1
26: t∗ ← t
27: else if bi(s, a1, a2) > t∗ then
28: learni(s, a1, a2)← false
29: end if
30: U i(s, a1, a2)← 0
31: li(s, a1, a2)← 0
32: end if
33: end if
34: end for
Lemma 5. The total number of attempted updates in Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm is bounded by 2∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1+
2κ).
Proof. In Appendix B.
Players decrease their state Nash value estimates as time goes on:
Lemma 6. Let t1 < t2 be two timesteps during the execution of Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm. Then under the
Assumption 1, for all states s and any player i, vit1(s) ≥ vit2(s).
Proof. In Appendix C.
Lemma 7. Suppose that the Delayed Nash Q-learning is executed on a Markov Game M under Assumption 1 with
parameter m satisfying
m ≥ ln ( 6∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1+2κ)δ )
221(1 − γ)2 ≃ O
⎛⎜⎝ ln (
∣S∣2∣A1∣2∣A2∣2
δ
)
21(1 − γ)2
⎞⎟⎠ . (7)
Then, Qit(s, a1, a2) ≥ Qi∗(s, a1, a2) and vit(s) ≥ vi∗(s) for any player i, state-action profile (s, a1, a2), and timestep t,
with probability at least 1 − δ
3
.
Proof. In Appendix D.
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Lemma 8. Under Assumption 1 and with the choice ofm as in (7), assume that the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm
is at timestep t with (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit , li(s, a) = 0 and learni(s, a1, a2) = true for player i. Knowing that an attempted
update of Qi(s, a1, a2) will necessarily occur within m occurrences of (s, a1, a2) after t, say at timestep tm, this
attempted update at tm will be successful with probability at least 1 − δ3 .
Proof. In Appendix E.
Lemma 9. Let t be the timestep when an unsuccessful update of Qi(s, a1, a2) occurs after the conditions of Lemma 8
were satisfied. If learni(s, a1, a2) = false at timestep t + 1, then (s, a1, a2) ∈Kit+1.
Proof. In Appendix F.
Lemma 10. During the execution of the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm, and assuming that Lemma 8 applies, the
total number of timesteps with (st, a1t , a2t ) ∉Kt (i.e. escape events) is at most 4mκ.
Proof. In Appendix G.
The PAC properties of Algorithm 1 can now be established in following form theorem, the proof of which is based
on an of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Consider a two-player Markov Game M = {S,A1,A2, T,R1,R2, γ}. Pick  ∈ (0, 1
1−γ ), and δ ∈ (0,1).
Then, with 1
1
= 3(1−γ) = O (1/(1 − γ)), there exists an integer
m = O ( ln (∣S∣2 ∣A1 ∣2 ∣A2 ∣2/δ)
21(1−γ)2 ) ,
such that if the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm is executed by both players under Assumption 1 and with the set Kt
defined as (6), the players will follow a policy which with probability at least 1 − 2δ is at most 4 worse than a Nash
policy, on all but O ( ∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣
4(1−γ)8 ) (8)
time steps (logarithmic factors ignored).
Proof. Apply Theorem 1. It is already shown in Lemma 7 that the optimism condition holds throughout the execution
of Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm.
To establish the accuracy condition, for all player i = 1,2 and all state s, write
viMKt (s, pi1t , pi2t ) = ∑(a1,a2)(s,a1,a2)∈Ktpi
1
t (s, a1)pi2t (s, a2) [Ri(s, a1, a2) + γ∑
s′ T (s, a1, a2, s′)viMKt (s′, pi1t , pi2t )]
+ ∑(a1,a2)(s,a1,a2)∉Ktpi
1
t (s, a1)pi2t (s, a2)Qit(s, a1, a2) (9)
Similarly,
vit(s) = ∑(a1,a2)pi1t (s, a1)pi2t (s, a2)Qit(s, a1, a2)
= ∑(a1,a2)(s,a1,a2)∈Ktpi
1
t (s, a1)pi2t (s, a2) [Ri(s, a1, a2) + γ∑
s′ T (s, a1, a2, s′)vit(s′) + βi(s, a1, a2)]
+ ∑(a1,a2)(s,a1,a2)∉Ktpi
1
t (s, a1)pi2t (s, a2)Qit(s, a1, a2) , (10)
where by the definition of Kt as (6), you know that βi(s, a1, a2) ≤ 31. To slightly simplify the notation, set
∆i(s) ≜ vit(s) − viMKt (s, pi1t , pi2t ). Now, if you denote
α ∶= max
s
(∆i(s)) = ∆i(s∗) ,
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by (9) and (10), it follows that α affords the bound
α = ∑(a1,a2)(s∗,a1,a2)∈Kt pi
1
t (s∗, a1)pi2t (s∗, a2) [γ∑
s′ T (s∗, a1, a2, s′)∆i(s′) + βi(s∗, a1, a2)]
≤ γα + 31 ,
from which it follows that α ≤ γα + 31 Ô⇒ α ≤ 31−γ = .
Finally, to confirm the complexity condition, invoke Lemmas 4 and 10 to see that the learning complexity ζ(, δ) is
bounded by 2κ + 4mκ.
In conclusion, the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied and therefore the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm is
PAC. Substituting ζ(, δ) into (5) yields (8) and completes the proof.
6 Simulation results
In this section, the performance of the Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm is evaluated on two grid-world games used
in work reported in literature [16].
The grid-world games 1 and 2 are shown in Figs. 1a and 1b, respectively, where the initial and goal positions of
each player is depicted. In grid-world game 1 the players have different goal positions; in 2, they have the same. Cells
are labeled in the order depicted in Fig. 1c. Both players can move only one cell a time, exercising one of four primitive
actions: down (d), left (l), up (u), and right (r). If the two players attempt to move together into any cell other than the
goal, they bounce back to their previous cells.
1 2
12
(a) Grid world 1
1 2
(b) Grid world 2
7 8 9
4 5 6
1 2 3
(c) Cell indexing
Figure 1: The two grid-world games where Delayed Nash Q-learning is tested (cf. [16]). The home cells are the goal
configurations for the two agents and the smiley faces mark their initial positions.
The state-space of the game is the set of pairs S = {(1,2), (1,3), . . . , (9,8)}, in which the first number is the
location of player 1 and the second number is the location of player 2. State (1,3) is the initial state, and all states in
which one of the players is in its goal location are terminal states. If a player reaches its goal position, it receives the
reward of 1, and for all other moves the reward is 0. Transitions in grid-world game 1 are deterministic; transitions in
grid-game 2 are also deterministic except for action up in cells 1 and 3 (shown by dashed lines in Fig. 1b). If player 1
(resp. 2) chooses action up in cell 1 (resp. 3), it will either move to cell 4 (resp. 6) with probability 0.5 or stay in the
same cell with probability 0.5.
Multiple Nash equilibrium strategies exist for grid-world game 1. Some examples are depicted in Fig. 2. For
grid-world game 2 on the other hand, there exist only two Nash equilibrium strategies: the ones shown in Fig. 3.
Note that all Nash equilibria in grid-world game 1 are globally optimal; however, there is no guarantee that all stage
games encountered during the execution of the learning algorithm possess a globally optimal Nash equilibrium [16].
On the other hand, none of the Nash equilibrium strategies for grid-world game 2 are globally optimal or saddles.
In the earlier study of these two grid-world games, it has been reported [16] that while both games do not
necessarily satisfy Assumption 1, the convergence of a Nash Q-learning algorithm is almost guaranteed for the game
that has an overall globally optimal or saddle Nash equilibrium strategy (e.g., grid-world game 1). For games that do
not, (e.g., grid-world game 2), a 79% probability of convergence using a Nash Q-learning algorithm was reported [16].
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Figure 2: Examples of Nash strategies for grid-world 1.
Figure 3: The Nash equilibrium strategies for grid-world 2.
In this paper, Delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm was implemented on the two grid-world games with the following
parameters: γ = 0.8, m = 50 and  = 0.06. The algorithm was run on each game for 50 times (matching [16]). Delayed
Nash Q-learning converged to a Nash equilibrium strategy profile, in both games, every time. The average number of
steps needed for convergence (the empirical sample complexity of the algorithm) was 445640 in the case of grid-world
game 1, and 485460 in the case of grid-world game 2.
7 Conclusion
Computational gains and analytical performance guarantees obtained recently in applications of RL to finite MDPs can
be extended to Markov games yielding a unique new PAC algorithm for learning game equilibria. A new sample-efficient
MARL algorithm for Markov games emerges as the outcome of careful integration of delayed Q-learning techniques
with Nash Q-learning methodologies. This algorithm, referred to as delayed Nash Q-learning, is guaranteed to converge
on finite samples, under the same assumptions utilized for Nash Q-learning. Numerical results not only support the
theoretical PAC predictions, but also indicate that the delayed Nash Q-learning algorithm performance may degrade
much more gracefully than that of Nash Q-learning when the underlying assumptions are violated.
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 4
Consider a fixed state-action profile (s, a1, a2). Its value Qi(s, a1, a2) for player i is initially set to vmax = 11−γ . When
an update is successful Qi(s, a1, a2) is reduced by at least 1 (because of the condition of line 24 of the algorithm).
Since the reward function Ri(s, a) is non-negative, Qi(s, a1, a2) ≥ 0 in all timesteps, which means that there can be at
most ⌊ 1
1(1−γ) ⌋ updates for Qi(s, a1, a2). With ∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣ total state-action profiles and since there are 2 players, the
total number updates is bounded by 2κ = 2 ∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1−γ)1 .
B Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose an attempted update occurs at timestep t to some Qi(s, a1, a2). By definition, in order for a subsequent
attempted update to Qi(s, a1, a2) to occur at timestep t′ > t, at least one update to any Nash Q-value estimate must
occur between t and t′. Lemma 4 ensures that there can be no more than 2κ (successful) updates. In other words,
the most frequent occurrence of an attempted update is interlaced between successful updates, which implies that at
most 1 + 2κ attempted updates are possible for Qi(s, a1, a2). Scaling this argument to all state-action profiles and both
players, we arrive at the 2∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1 + 2κ) upper bound.
C Proof of Lemma 6
Show the lemma for player 1; the proof for the other player is identical. First note that because the Delayed Nash
Q-learning algorithm only allows updates that decrease the Q estimates, for all state s ∈ S
Q1t1(s, a1, a2) ≥ Q1t2(s, a1, a2) ∀(a1, a2) ∈ A1 ×A2 .
Let (pi1t1 , pi2t1) and (pi1t2 , pi2t2) be the Nash equilibria of stage games associated with state s, at timesteps t1 and t2,
respectively. Then, write
v1t1(s) = ∑(a1,a2)pi1t1(s, a1) ⋅ pi2t1(s, a2) ⋅Q1t1(s, a1, a2)
v1t2(s) = ∑(a1,a2)pi1t2(s, a1) ⋅ pi2t2(s, a2) ⋅Q1t2(s, a1, a2) .
If the stage games possess global optimal Nash equilibrium, it will be
v1t1(s) global optimal≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1t2(s, a1)pi2t2(s, a2)Q1t1(s, a1, a2)≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1t2(s, a1)pi2t2(s, a2)Q1t2(s, a1, a2) = v1t2(s) ,
whereas if the stage games possess saddle point Nash Equilibrium, v1t1 is bounded as
v1t1(s) Nash equilibrium≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1t2(s, a1)pi2t1(s, a2)Q1t1(s, a1, a2)≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1t2(s, a1)pi2t1(s, a2)Q1t2(s, a1, a2)
saddle≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1t2(s, a1)pi2t2(s, a2)Q1t2(s, a1, a2) = v1t2(s) .
Thus in any case, it will be v1t1(s) ≥ v1t2(s) and the proof is completed.
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D Proof of Lemma 7
Prove the claim for player 1; the proof for the other player is identical. The proof involves strong induction for all
state-action profile (s, a1, a2):
(i) At t = 1, the values of all state-action profiles are set to the maximum possible Nash value of the Markov Game
M . This implies that Q11(s, a1, a2) ≥ Q1∗(s, a1, a2) and v11(s) ≥ v1∗(s).
(ii) Assume that Q1t (s, a1, a2) ≥ Q1∗(s, a1, a2) and v1t (s) ≥ v1∗(s) for all timesteps up to and including t = n − 1.
(iii) If no successful update happens during the timestep t = n − 1, then
Q1n(s, a1, a2) = Q1n−1(s, a1, a2) ≥ Q1∗(s, a1, a2) , v1n(s) = v1n−1 ≥ v1∗(s)
and the claim is immediately established. If not, assume that during the timestep t = n − 1, the state-action
profile for which the update occurs is (s, a1, a2). Suppose that the latest m experiences of (s, a1, a2) happened
at timesteps t1 < t2 < ⋯ < tm = n − 1, at which the player was rewarded r1[1], r1[2], . . . , r1[m] and the
game jumped to states s[1], s[2], . . . , s[m], respectively. Define the random variable Y ∶= r1[i] + γv1∗(s[i]) for
1 ≤ i ≤m and note that 0 ≤ Y ≤ 1
1−γ . Then a direct application of the Hoeffding inequality for bounded random
variables and with the choice of m as in (7) implies
1
m
m∑
i=1 (r1[i] + γv1∗(s[i])) > E{Y } − 1 = Q1∗(s, a1, a2) − 1
with probability 1 − δ/6(∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1 + 2κ)). Now you have:
Q1n(s, a1, a2) = 1m( m∑i=1 r1[i] + γv1ti(s[i])) + 1≥ 1
m
( m∑
i=1 r1[i] + γv1∗(s[i])) + 1≥ Q1∗(s, a1, a2) − 1 + 1= Q1∗(s, a1, a2) .
To show v1n(s) ≥ v1∗(s), first note that
v1n(s) = ∑(a1,a2)pi1n(s, a1)pi2n(s, a2)Q1n(s, a1, a2) ,
where (pi1n, pi2n) denotes the policy executed at timestep t = n. If the stage games possess global optimum Nash
equilibrium,
v1n(s) global optimum≥ ∑(a1,a2) pi1∗(s, a1)pi2∗(s, a2)Q1n(s, a1, a2)≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1∗(s, a1)pi2∗(s, a2)Q1∗(s, a1, a2) = v1∗(s) .
If the stage games possess a saddle point Nash Equilibrium,
v1n(s) Nash equilibrium≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1∗(s, a1)pi2n(s, a2)Q1n(s, a1, a2)≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1∗(s, a1)pi2n(s, a2)Q1∗(s, a1, a2)
saddle≥ ∑(a1,a2)pi1∗(s, a1)pi2∗(s, a2)Q1∗(s, a1, a2) = v1∗(s) .
The induction argument is thus complete. Since the conclusion has to be true for all possible attempted updates, invoke
Lemma 5, according to which 2∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1 + 2κ) is an upper bound for all possible attempted updates. Therefore,
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the statement above is true with probability at least (1 − δ/6(∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1 + 2κ)))2∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1+2κ). Another induction
argument can now be employed to show that 1 − δ
3
bounds the latter expression from below.
E Proof of Lemma 8
Assume that at timestep t, (s, a1, a2) ∉ Kit , li(s, a) = 0 and learni(s, a) = true, and suppose that m experiences of(s, a1, a2) happen at timesteps t ≤ t1 < t2 < ⋯ < tm. Since li(s, a) = 0 and learni(s, a) = true, an attempted update
will necessarily happen. Let ri[1], ri[2], . . . , ri[m] and s[1], s[2], . . . , s[m] be the rewards and next states observed
for the m experiences of (s, a1, a2) for player i. Then define the random variable X ∶= ri[j] + γvit(s[j]), letting j
range in {1, . . . ,m}, and note that 0 ≤X ≤ 1
1−γ .
A direct application of the Hoeffding inequality with the choice of m as in (7) yields
1
m
⎛⎝ m∑j=1 ri[j] + γvit(s[j])⎞⎠ −E{X} < 1
with probability 1 − δ
6∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1+2κ) . Note that there can be at most 2∣S∣∣A1∣∣A2∣(1 + 2κ) instances of such an event.
Since Lemma 6 shows that all Nash Q-value estimates are decreasing during the execution of Delayed Nash Q-learning
algorithm, for the condition on line 24 of Algorithm 1, write:
Qit(s, a1, a2) − 1m ⎛⎝ m∑j=1 ri[j] + γvitj(s[j])⎞⎠ ≥ Qit(s, a1, a2) − 1m ⎛⎝ m∑j=1 ri[j] + γvit(s[j])⎞⎠> Qit(s, a1, a2) −E{X} − 1 ,
and because (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit meaning Qit(s, a1, a2) −E{X} > 31,
Qit(s, a1, a2) −E{X} − 1 > 21 ,
guaranteeing success for the update at timestep tm. Working similarly to the proof of Lemma 7, one concludes that the
successful update will occur with probability at least 1 − δ
3
.
F Proof of Lemma 9
Suppose an unsuccessful update of Qi(s, a1, a2) occurs at timestep t, and right after, at timestep t + 1 you observe
learni(s, a1, a2) = false. Set up a contradiction argument: under those conditions, assume that (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit+1. Since
the update at t was unsuccessful, Kit+1 =Kit , which also implies that (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit . Now label the times of the most
recent m experiences of (s, a1, a2) as bi(s, a1, a2) ∶= t1 < t2 < ⋯ < tm = t. The contrapositive of the statement proved
in Lemma 8 states that given an unsuccessful update at t, it must be (s, a1, a2) ∈Kit1 . Since (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit , some other
update must have happened between t1 and t. Denote the timestep of that update t∗, and note that t∗ ≥ bi(s, a1, a2).
Observe now that the condition t1 = bi(s, a1, a2) ≤ t∗ would not have allowed the learn flag to be set to false (line
27 of Algorithm 1). Therefore, there is a contradiction. The assumption originally made is invalid, which means(s, a1, a2) ∈Kit+1.
G Proof of Lemma 10
Fix a state-action profile (s, a1, a2) and chose a player i. Show first that if (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit is experienced at timestep t,
then within at most 2m subsequent experiences of (s, a1, a2), a successful update of Qi(s, a1, a2) must occur; to do so,
follow this process:
For (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit , distinguish two possible cases at the beginning of timestep t: either learni(s, a1, a2) = false
or learni(s, a1, a2) = true.
(i) Consider first the case where learni(s, a1, a2) = false. Assume that the most recent attempted update of
Qi(s, a1, a2) occurred at some timestep t′ which was unsuccessful and set the flag learni(s, a1, a2) to false.
Then, according to Lemma 9, it will be (s, a1, a2) ∈ Kit′+1. However, now it is (s, a1, a2) ∉ Kit , which implies
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that some update must have occurred at some t∗ with t′ + 1 < t∗ < t. Thus at the beginning of timestep t, the
flag learni(s, a1, a2) will set to true (line 15 of Algorithm 1). At timestep t all conditions of Lemma 8 (i.e.
learni(s, a1, a2) = true, (s, a1, a2) ∉ Kit and li(s, a1, a2) = 0) are satisfied, and thus the attempted update of
Qi(s, a1, a2) upon the mth visit of (s, a1, a2) after timestep t will have to be successful.
(ii) Take now the case where learni(s, a1, a2) = true. It is given that an attempted update for Qi(s, a1, a2) will occur
in at mostm additional experiences of (s, a1, a2), which can be assumed occurring at timesteps t1 < ⋯ < tm, and it
is t1 ≤ t ≤ tm. Consider the two possibilities: (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit1 or (s, a1, a2) ∈Kit1 . In the former case, Lemma 8
indicates that the attempted update at tm will be successful. In the latter case, given that (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit , some
successful update at t∗ must have taken place between t1 and t (since Kit1 ≠Kit ). If the attempted update at tm is
unsuccessful, learni(s, a1, a2) remains true and at timestep tm + 1 it is learni(s, a1, a2) = true, li(s, a1, a2) = 0
and (s, a) ∉Kitm+1; this now triggers Lemma 8, which implies that the attempted update of Qi(s, a1, a2) upon
the mth visit of (s, a1, a2) after timestep tm + 1 (within at most 2m more experiences of (s, a1, a1) after t), will
be successful.
You have thus shown that after an event (s, a1, a2) ∉Kit , an update for Qi(s, a1, a2) must occur within at most
2m more experiences of (s, a1, a2). The proof of Lemma 4 shows why the total number of successful updates for(s, a1, a2) is bounded by 1(1−γ)1 . Given this fact, the total number of timesteps with (s, a1, a2) ∉ Kit is bounded by
2m(1−γ)1 .
Generalizing the above statement for all state-action profiles and all players, one concludes that the total number
of escape events (timesteps t with (st, a1t , a2t ) ∉Kt) is bounded by 4mκ.
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